While scrolling through the New York Times Entertainment Critic's column a couple of weeks back, I was struck by the reviewer's high praise of the Christopher Nolan film, "Oppenheimer." As I shall shortly explain, I have a more than passing connection with his history, so I watched the trailer which concluded with an engaging interview with the cast and director. During the discussion, Nolan offered the comment that Oppenheimer may have been the greatest person who ever lived.
Well, I and several billion others might suggest a different name for this accolade, but I got his point despite the hyperbole. Oppie, as this conflicted soul of immense intellect was known to his miniscule circle of friends, is the father of the atom bomb. That alone, you'll have to admit, is quite a resume. It is also one hell of a story. In 1943, he was charged with creating and directing a laboratory, which he cobbled together on a barren scrap of land a few miles northwest of Santa Fe, New Mexico, to try and build such a device. Money was no object, as it was virtually certain that Hitler already had a parallel effort underway.
The work grew rapidly and soon several thousand scientists, engineers, their families and a large complement of Army support personnel poured through the gate. The small town of Los Alamos just north swelled in tandem, eventually giving its name to its voracious neighbor.
Despite its importance, the lab was only a small cog in a nationwide effort titled the Manhattan Project, under the leadership of Army Colonel Leslie Groves, who drove the work with a relentless determination that quickly earned him two stars. The Project was cloaked in utmost secrecy; other than Oppenheimer and select visitors, no one, including family members, was allowed to leave the facility for any reason for the next two years (excluding the spouses of native Americans living nearby who served in many of the bare bones houses as domestics).
The world bore witness to Oppie's success when, in August of 1945, two Japanese cities--and 200,000 of their citizens--were vaporized in the blink of an eye. Knowledge of such an astounding weapon could not be contained; spies for Russia's Stalin managed to penetrate the wall of secrecy and within four years the Soviet Union tested its first weapon, followed in a decade by Great Britain, France, and China.
Predictably, as is the hallmark of every arms race, technology hungry scientists, urged on by powerful economic and political interests, pressed for the development of increasingly powerful weapons of more disparate types in ever larger arsenals. By 1954, the atom bomb had been relegated to the role of a trigger for the "Super" as the hydrogen bomb was initially dubbed. Yes, you read that correctly: the conditions necessary to initiate the explosion of a hydrogen bomb can only be achieved through the otherworldly power of an atom bomb, very much akin to the manner in which the crushing power of gravity creates a star. Indeed, our sun is just one cosmic hydrogen bomb which in its death throes will destroy our planet...unless we manage to do it ourselves first.
That very real prospect came to plague Oppenheimer. Even as he was working night and day to build an atom bomb, he began to express his concerns about proliferation privately to his fellow scientists. His fear became so consuming that he decided to take his case directly to President Truman. The blunt-spoken Missourian had just replaced FDR who died without telling his vice president about the Manhattan Project. Though Germany surrendered within weeks after Truman took office, he chose to continue the development program in the event that it might shorten the war against Japan. Hence, Oppenheimer's plea for caution fell on deaf ears. Truman cut their conversation short, snapped at him for meddling in a political matter and had him unceremoniously tossed from the Oval Office--a forerunner of worst treatment to come at the hands of his government.
Although I knew this history quite well, I decided to see the movie in order to judge how faithfully Nolan had portrayed his subject. At the risk of sounding like a film critic, I found Cillian Murphy's resurrection of a tortured Oppenheimer trying to square his zeal for his scientific mission with his profound misgivings regarding proliferation extraordinary. In truth, it hit very close to home. The scene in the Oval Office rekindled a turmoil that, 30 years ago, roiled my own sense of humanity and compelled me to make a highly visible disavowal of my government that sent shock waves through the corridors of power.
Although akin to nuclear proliferation, my angst cut much deeper and its public expression cost me dearly. To do it justice, I must hit pause and turn the clock back 66 years, in order to set a bookend for the narrative that will follow.
That trip back in time lands us on the porch where I dropped you off at the conclusion of my previous blog, "Doors and Hinges." As I dig the rhetorical footing for this first bookend, let me give you a brief recap of what got us this far:
"In January of 1957, an Undersized Child of the Deep South from an Army Family miraculously passes Entrance Examination for the Air Force Academy."
There, done. Now, I'm going to fast forward through 40 of those 66 years we just rewound and plant the other bookend. We are no longer at the threshold of the Air Force Academy, but rather in the 4,500 square-foot ballroom of the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., the nation's most historic and prestigious forum for public affairs. A lunch had just concluded and the host had begun his introduction of the guest speaker to an overflow audience comprising a cross section of experts in the nuclear weapons enterprise. The speaker would be me and the responses to my remarks will be varied, ranging from strongly supportive to vehemently opposed.
The date is Friday, December the 6th, 1996. My appearance had been hyped by a cover story article in the previous Sunday's Washington Post magazine, which is read widely in the capital area. From my seat adjacent to the podium, I can readily see the impact of the coverage as my gaze sweeps across the vast chamber and gradually finds the back of the room. There, packed shoulder-to-shoulder, is a throng of television and radio journalists from around the world poised to broadcast my remarks. As seasoned D.C. professionals, they know how to read the tea leaves: this would be a front page story.
Now, dear reader, I must pause to catch my breath and consider how best to explain this, how shall I say, unlikely circumstance. I must also gird my loins because I know that just recalling it here will, as it always does, slice me like a piece of broken glass...just as it did while sitting with a friend in a darkened theater watching Oppenheimer, the movie.
Let's begin in an Air Force Academy classroom in July of 1957 where I was also viewing a film that was part and parcel of the education/socialization for new cadets. It dramatized the threat posed by the Russians, most prominently their thermonuclear weapons as portrayed in towering pillars of radioactive earth thrown miles into the sky, gradually taking the familiar shape of a blossoming mushroom cloud. The film had its desired effect; at graduation, four years later, I was wearing the golden bars of a second lieutenant, poised for a career as a pilot ready at a moment's notice to defend his nation against an insidious Soviet threat.
That threat never became more real than a year later, during 13 days in October of 1962. By chance, this was a seminal moment in my life. I had just married the woman with whom I had fallen madly in love (literally fallen--I was on a trampoline during a gymnastics competition when I first saw her); I had just completed a year-long pilot training program shortly after we said our wedding vows (" shortly after" meant our first home for three weeks was a motel in Chandler, Arizona...I told her things would get better...they did not); I had just been selected as an instructor pilot (stationed at a base just outside of...wait for it...Selma, Alabama); and I had just trekked through a freezing blizzard at the end of a winter survival course, ravenous for a hot meal (here comes the big finish). After being trucked to a nearby air base, I was racing toward the kitchen of the officers club when the unmistakable voice of President Kennedy from a nearby TV stopped me dead in my tracks. I stood frozen (quite literally) in place and watched JFK put the Soviet Union on notice that an attack on the U.S. by a missile fired from Cuba would be considered an act of war by the Soviet Union and he would respond accordingly.
I pause to insist on this moment for two reasons. First, because it brought the world within a coin flip of annihilation in the boiling cauldron of a thermonuclear holocaust. Second, it's aftershocks influenced every point of my career in the military and subsequent walks of life either by design or by chance. I may well come back to some of those decisive points in future blogs, but for the purpose of this one I need to move on quickly in order reach the era of my life that changed everything.
The years that followed are a kaleidoscope of events that in retrospect seem to range from the improbable to the unimaginable: the birth of two children in widely disparate locations--son Brett, in Selma, Alabama, and daughter, Lisa, in Paris, France; ejecting during takeoff in a single engine T-33 jet trainer in April, 1963 (I was an instructor with a terrified student in the rear cockpit)...and from a twin engine F-4 jet fighter in April, 1968 (with a veteran pilot in the rear cockpit who narrowly escaped death after ejecting); moving 34 times in the first 40 years of our marriage while being promoted nine times, flying 15 different types of aircraft, and serving three times in the Pentagon (the earthly equivalent of Purgatory)..
Along the way, I completed a master's degree at the University of Paris; taught political science at the Air Force. Academy; served a stint in the White House; had command of two B-52 units, one in California the other in Texas; served as the Inspector General for the Strategic Air Command; served in 15 different roles during my Pentagon assignments, to include responsibilities for nuclear arms control, military planning for the armed forces, global U.S. military alliances, negotiating a major agreement with the Soviet Union military, and drafting a new national security strategy for a post-Cold War world at the behest of my boss, Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
All the while, the two superpowers were relentlessly expanding and enhancing their arsenals of thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems. The United States alone would spend six trillion (yes, trillion) dollars on this enterprise, from the Manhattan Project until the first day of June, 1992. That stupendous sum was expended in creating an astounding array of strategic nuclear forces: successive fleets of bomber aircraft, ground-based missiles and missile bearing submarines, comprising a triad of disparate delivery systems which by the early '90s could be married to 10,000 warheads of myriad types and destructive power. The largest fraction of these warheads were poised for launch on a moments notice, many literally within seconds. While the bombers could be recalled in the event of an accidental or unintentional launch, the torrent of missiles pouring from land-based silos and submarine tubes were irretrievable. They could neither be called back nor destroyed in flight; once launched, their flight and their consequences were inevitable.
These operational forces were only the tip of an enormous iceberg. They were supported by laboratories for the design of successive families of nuclear devices; an enormous infrastructure for their manufacture, as well as for the production of fissile material; a phalanx of theorists and strategists; over a dozen intelligence organizations, of which just one commanded a budget of over ten billion dollars; a massive military-industrial complex, with tentacles reaching into every aspect of American society; globe circling, redundant command, control and communication networks, in the skies, the ground and under the seas; and scores of survivable options for essential "continuity of government" activities, many deeply buried, one of the most important being wedged into a mountain range in Colorado and another, for the most senior US government officials, built beneath a well known golfing resort within hailing distance of the nation's capital.
Perhaps this brief overview gives you some idea of how quickly, over a span of 50 years, six trillion dollars from the national treasury can be expended pursuing, ahem, mutual assured destruction, or MAD, as the U.S. nuclear national security strategy has been known known since the advent of its forebearer: the theory of Deterrence.
Since my retirement from the military, I have often given a lecture of sorts to a variety of interlocutors-- authors, journalists, academics, politicians and even movie directors--to put all this into a context that I called The Nuclear Weapons Enterprise. Marshalling the expertise for such a presentation required all of my experience from those first days as a cadet to my last day in uniform as a four-star general. I had mastered every aspect this Enterprise entailed and had been directly responsible for much of it during my career. And now, it will urge me up the last few steps to the podium I mounted some 27 years ago. Each of those steps recalls a moment, or event, or procedure or practice that I found most disturbing, distressing, devastating and to my mind unforgivable along the way.
The most significant of these biographical IEDs came in the latter three years of my time on active duty. Those years began with no small measure of professional satisfaction at having reached a position for which I had been groomed by a half dozen senior Air Force mentors. Thanks to the opportunities they provided me, and yes, a lot of sacrifices along the way on my part--and most assuredly on the part of my family--in January of 1991 I was promoted to a fourth star and took command of the Air Force's bombers and land-base missiles. One year later, the President of the United States accepted my proposal to consolidate all of the strategic nuclear forces in one set of hands, which is to say I would also be given command of the Navy's 18 Trident submarines, each laden with a 24 missiles, each missile armed with eight thermonuclear warheads...you can do the math. Together, these three sets of forces were capable of delivering the 10,000 warheads in our strategic arsenal and their operation was now my responsibility.
There were two additional tasks in my portfolio that I need to spend a bit of time addressing with you. The first was to design the nuclear war plan, that is to say, decide where those warheads should be targeted. It was then known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, and was mind-boggling in it's complexity. Three floors of my headquarters were filled with the computers required to pull the delivery of all those weapons together in such a way that their routes and explosive consequences were deconflicted, that their capability was suited to their target, and that their destructiveness did not encroach beyond the limits designated in presidential guidance.
My third responsibility was by far the most challenging and consequential: I was the principal advisor to the president in the event of nuclear war. The long and short of it was this: should our warning systems detect an attack on the United States, presumably by the Soviet Union, my role was to advise the President that we were under attack; to characterize it in terms of the type and number of weapons and their targets; to advise him of his options as portrayed in the nuclear war plan; to elicit an execution order; and promptly transmit it to the operational forces to ensure their timely launch, survival and delivery of their weapons.
The thrust of that conference is that by the time a typical attack had been detected and validated; I had been advised; the President had been brought on line; and I had taken him through the essence of the attack, in the best case there may have been 12 minutes for me to elicit a decision from the President.
This scenario was practiced once a month on a no-notice basis, as follows: I would receive a call out of the blue from the National Command Center in the Pentagon anytime day or night informing me the land- and space-based arrays of warning sensors had just provided unmistakable detection of an attack, it's size, and the likely targets; and that the President was being brought online. Until I heard the voice at the other end, which was typically not the president but a stand-in, I did not know whether this was a drill or an actual attack. But in any event, I treated it as real. What will stay with me forever about the conversation which followed is this. In every single case, no matter who was playing the president, after I confirmed the attack and it's nature, it's likely consequences, and walked through the available response options, when I asked the momentous question, "Mr. President, what is your decision?" the response came: "General Butler, what is your recommendation?"
What that obviously implied is that I, an unelected government servant, was put in the position of deciding the fate of likely half the living things on the planet (I'll explain that in a moment). I went through this scenario every month for three years while commander of the strategic nuclear forces, and behaved every minute day and night as if I might find myself in that circumstance.
You can imagine the toll that this responsibility might take over that course of time: the unique position, held by a relative few officers; the surreal scenario that required the utmost calm while discussing with the utmost urgency the prospect of putting hundreds of millions of lives at risk, utterly destroying their nation, their history, their hopes, their dreams; the terrible reality of knowing that this discussion would be taking place in the midst of the utter devastation of this country, America, from sea to shining sea, reduced to a pile of radioactive rubble where the living would surely envy the dead.
Now, to give you some idea of the decision-making scenario I am sketching in the quiet of my blog- cave, imagine for a moment that you are the President of the United States, weighing the options which I have presented for a retaliatory response to an all out, bolt from the blue attack on our country by the Soviet Union. Setting aside whatever reasons might have prompted such a nuclear Pearl Harbor, you have already given thought to the fact that whatever response you choose will have no military significance for obvious reasons: we would not have survived a massive first strike from a Russian arsenal that was a mirror image of our own...10,000 thermonuclear warheads launched by a similar array of delivery systems. Having war gamed their likely strike plan many times, there is no doubt in my mind that this represented the capacity to destroy our nation several times over. Indeed, you can run a simplistic version of the apocalyptic math in your head: dividing those 10,000 warheads by our 50 states would allocate 200 to whichever of our cultural packets in which you may reside. Next, subtract from that 200 whatever number of typical Russian five megaton devices (one megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT--the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima equated to 15,000 tons of TNT) you might imagine it would take to render your home state unlivable--or perhaps non-existent (as an example, three should do nicely to eradicate the city proper of Los Angeles). Now you should have a pretty good picture of what the word "overkill" portends.
This then, is your perspective as you consider the array of options I have presented, ranging from quite limited to an all out launch that nearly empties our nuclear arsenal. Such a response in kind would without question completely destroy the Soviet Union and whichever of their allies in the Warsaw Pact you decide not to exempt from our retaliation (I must name individually for you each of the six nations). In round numbers you will be choosing who among some 400 million of your fellow humans will be issued a death warrant, from both the strike itself (the blast, flames and short term radiation, and the longer arriving fallout (an agonizing way to leave this earth). Nor would that be the end of it. Within a matter of a few days, globe-circling winds will have showered that radiation over every square kilometer of the planet. The earth would remain shrouded by a noxious, poisonous cloud long enough to ensure that there would be no recovery, not for several lifetimes if at all.
Think on this now for a moment. Ask yourself if you would have the equanimity to select some lesser response to such an attack if only to spare hundreds of millions of people who had no part in the decision to strike our country. Or would the impulse of an eye for an eye retaliation be overwhelming, if only to ensure that the Soviet leaders emerging from their deeply buried survival shelters would have no one to govern? If this harrowing outcome is the cost of Deterrence failing, one would have to ask if the six trillion dollar premium was worth it.
By the time my retirement from military service relieved me of these responsibilities, I was deeply troubled by what I perceived as the insanity of an ideological confrontation that had deepened into such a visceral enmity that it accepted mutual annihilation as the best solution to our mutual security fears. Having witnessed innumerable crises, accidents and false alarm over the years I had long since understood that this was not a game nor a low probability outcome. I knew, for example, from histories by participants on both sides of the Cuban missile crisis, that we had escaped a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck and divine intervention.
I was spared two more years of these baleful responsibilities by my decision to retire before my mandatory separation date. I took off my uniform for the last time on the 14th of February 1994, comforted by the prospect that with the end of the Cold War, we might also be seeing the end of the nuclear nightmare. I had been uniquely privileged to participate in helping to pull back the veil of distrust and to form genuine friendships with former enemies. Hence, I was profoundly dismayed by the subsequent loss of political will as key officials left office, ushering in an era when too many of their successors were uninterested, inept or unwilling; and nuclear weapons policy retreated to darkly suspicious Cold War thinking. Relations between the U.S. and Russia gradually deteriorated and over time the stage was perfectly set for the advent of Vladimir Putin, a murderous thug who had long harbored visceral enmity for America. The door to a more hopeful future slowly swung closed, leaving the world once more at the mercy of superpower antagonism. The invoices for mutual assured destruction are again piling up at the door to the nation's Treasury as bills come due for a ten-year, trillion dollar modernization of the nuclear triad.
As I watched these events unfold, my dismay slowly turned to distress and then a smoldering anger over the loss of priceless opportunities to draw mankind back from the brink of nuclear annihilation. That is why I accepted an invitation from the president of the National Press Club to speak to my experience and concerns before the kind of prestigious, expert audience that his organization assembled.
How that invitation came about is a story for another time. For a moment though, it serves the important purpose of bringing me to my present destination: the second bookend of this blog. Hopefully, during our journey I have related enough of my personal history for you to understand why my speech created a global sensation. I was the first commander of his nation's strategic nuclear forces to declare them militarily irrelevant, politically useless and utterly immoral; that they neither provide for the common defense nor promote the general welfare; and that the only certainty they do provide, beyond measure, is the promise of nuclear deterrence:
Mutual Assured Destruction.